



# DDoS Mitigation Service @Belnet & Case Study Ministry of Finance

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# Agenda



- DDoS : Definition and types
- DDoS Mitigation @ Belnet before
- DDoS Mitigation Service: Architecture and characteristics
- Experience sharing from Ministry of Finance

# DoS : Definition



## DoS – Denial of Service


A Denial of Service attack is an attempt to render a machine or network resource **unavailable to its intended users**, by temporarily or indefinitely **disrupting the services** of a host connected to the Internet.

### What resources?

- Network server, client or router
  - Network link or entire network
  - ...
- 
- D DoS – Distributed Denial of Service
    - The attack originates not from one or a few machines, but is distributed across **a vast amount of attacking machines** all over the internet



# DDoS : So how does it work?





# DDoS types




Layer	Function
<b>Application (7)</b>	Services that are used with end user applications
<b>Presentation (6)</b>	Formats the data so that it can be viewed by the user Encrypt and decrypt
<b>Session (5)</b>	Establishes/ends connections between two hosts
<b>Transport (4)</b>	Responsible for the transport protocol and error handling
<b>Network (3)</b>	Reads the IP address form the packet.
<b>Data Link (2)</b>	Reads the MAC address from the data packet
<b>Physical (1)</b>	Send data on to the physical wire.

**Application-layer DDoS attack**


**State-exhaustion DDoS attack**

**Volumetric DDoS attack**

# DDoS Attack trends



Source: AWS shield protect web application of Amazon




# Background 2016



- A lot of DDoS attacks against:
  - Federal institutions
  - Education institutions
- Manual mitigation:
  - Customer complaint
  - Analyze of the traffic
  - Identify of the attack pattern
  - Apply some filters
- Negative aspects
  - Slow to implement
  - Analyze required each time attack vector changed
  - Only a reactive process
- A lot of requests from customers about what could be done




# Service Architecture




- Belnet replied to the customer requests and started a project to implement DDoS Mitigation Service

# Belnet Architecture



# Service Description

- Always On
- Automatic Detection
- Automatic Mitigation
- Protection against:
  - Volumetric attacks (reflection/amplification)
  - L3, L4 attacks, IPv4 and IPv6
  - Flooding (SYN, ACK, PSH, RST, ICMP, UDP)
  - Fragments
  - Protocol Anomalies



# Belnet DDoS Mitigation

## Standard DoS Profile



DoS Vector
ICMP flood
IP fragment flood
TCP PSH flood
TCP RST flood
TCP SYN ACK flood
TCP SYN flood
UDP flood



## With Belnet

- ❖ Traffic does NOT leave Belnet network
- ❖ No re-routing latency
- ❖ Can protect 1 IP or whole subnet
- ❖ No extra bandwidth cost for clean traffic
- ❖ Future Proof
  - *cf. BGP Origin Validation*

**One partner for everything**



## Without Belnet

- ❖ Customer traffic re-routed outside to third party
- ❖ Clean traffic re-enters network via GRE tunnel
- ❖ Minimum size /24
  - Cannot protect individual 1 IPs*
- ❖ Additional bandwidth cost for GRE
- ❖ Not future proof
  - *BGP hijacking*

**2 Parties, 2 services, 2 contracts**

# Project and proof of concept



- April 2016: Project DDoS Mitigation Service started
- May 2016: Hardware installed in our DataCenters
- Summer 2016: First tests
- Sep/Oct 2016: 3 customers protected by the solution
- Oct 2016 – Apr 2017: Fine tuning
- June 15<sup>th</sup> 2017: Launch date






# Federal Public Service FINANCE



www.taxonweb.be



Tax-on-web 2017 compte actuellement


3 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 9 | 3 | déclarations

# DDOS attack on Tax-on-Web



- 8 june 2016
- Attack on a public IP of the outer firewall
  - 10 Gbps internet link saturated
  - IPS module of the firewall crashed
  - Firewall CPU at 100%

Graphics\* of your connection(s)  
Financieren/Finances - PoP Access FEDMAN



# DDOS attack on Tax-on-Web



- Duration +- 20m between 14h20 and 14h40
- Impact:
  - standstill of all incoming from the internet, including Tax-on-Web
  - standstill of outgoing traffic to internet, s.a. O365.

# Claim by Down-Sec Belgium



- The attack was claimed on Twitter
- The attack was part of a larger anti-government campaign by Down-Sec Belgium
- Other government sites such as senate.be and premier.be had been attacked in the weeks before

**Down-Sec**

@DownSecBelgium

Follow

[eservices.minfin.fgov.be](http://eservices.minfin.fgov.be) tax on web  
TangoDown ! #DownSecBelgium #OpGuerilla  
Expect Us !

Check website <http://eservices.minfin.fgov.be:80>

Permanent link to this check report | Share report:

Location	Result	Time	Code
Austria, Vienna	Connection timed out		
Belgium, Brussels	Connection timed out		
Canada, Ottawa	Connection timed out		
Germany, Dusseldorf	Connection timed out		
Hong Kong, Central District	Connection timed out		
Israel, Tel Aviv	Connection timed out		
Italy, Milano	Connection timed out		
Latvia, Riga	Connection timed out		
Moldova, Chisinau	Connection timed out		
Netherlands, Amsterdam	Connection timed out		
Portugal, Lisbon	Connection timed out		
Russian Federation, Moscow	Connection timed out		
Spain, Madrid	Connection timed out		
Sweden, Stockholm	Connection timed out		

4:55 AM - 8 Jun 2016

5 Retweets 3 Likes







# Countermeasures



- Limitation of traffic originated from foreign countries to a certain maximal bandwidth
- Discussions with Belnet were started to use their anti-DDoS protection services

# After one year of collaboration






# Thank you for your attention




.be

# Monitor



- Monitoring of the capacity is done after the mitigation

# Netflow



- Netflow collects data before the mitigation
- Characteristics
  - UDP port 443